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The politics of reforms in Bismarckian welfare systems 
 
Bruno Palier 
 
Summary  : Countries that share a particular social protection system, of Bismarckian 
inspiration and based on social insurance, seem to encounter similar and particularly 
awkward difficulties. They also seem to be following parallel trends in reforms, with respect 
to both their timing and their content and process. This paper is an attempt to compare the 
development of Bismarckian welfare systems during the last 25 years, showing the common 
pattern of reform. 
 
‘Welfare States in Transition’ (Esping-Andersen, 1996), ‘Recasting European Welfare 
States’ (Ferrera and Rhodes, 2000), ‘Welfare State Futures’ (Leibfried, 2000), ‘The Survival 
of the European Welfare State’ (Kuhnle, 2000), ‘From vulnerabilities to competitiveness’ 
(subtitle of Scharpf and Schmidt (eds.) 2000), ‘The New Politics of the Welfare State’ 
(Pierson 2001a), ‘Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in Developed 
Welfare States’, (Swank, 2002) - these are among the most important recent publications on 
the welfare state. Their titles indicate that the focus of the academic agenda has now moved 
beyond the crisis of the welfare state, and towards an analysis of actual social policy changes 
that have occurred during the last 20 to 25 years. While during the 1980s, attention centred 
firstly (following the OECD, the new right or Marxist authors) on analysing welfare state 
crisis, and then (following Titmuss and Esping-Andersen’s work) on understanding the 
differences between welfare states, the key preoccupation is now the analysis and 
understanding of welfare reforms. In pursuit of this objective, recent comparisons of welfare 
state reforms have either analysed all types of welfare regimes, or instead focused on the 
liberal or Nordic regimes specifically. But to date no systematic comparative research has 
been conducted on the recent developments of the Bismarckian, “conservative corporatist” 
welfare regimes that are mainly based on social insurance mechanisms.  
Despite an absence of systematic comparison within the Bismarckian family of 
welfare systems, the general literature on welfare state change paints a specific picture of 
these systems’ development, based on the contrasts with other regimes. In this perspective, 
the general literature usually concludes that, despite the fact that they are facing the biggest 
challenges, and are the most in need of transformation, Bismarckian welfare systems have 
proved almost wholly incapable of implementing important reforms. 
In this paper, a review of the current literature on welfare state change is confronted to 
some preliminary findings on actual developments in Bismarckian welfare systems in recent 
years (part 1). The literature review will draw attention to the lack of systematic comparative 
research on the development of Bismarckian welfare systems. Juxtaposing the literature to 
existing - but currently dispersed - analyses of welfare reforms in Bismarckian welfare 
systems highlights the need to systematise an approach sensitive to the impact of welfare 
institutions on both difficulties encountered and reforms adopted (Part two). The dominant 
interpretation of the situation in Bismarckian welfare systems is then questioned with 
reference to evidence showing that more reforms have occurred - and are occurring – within 
such systems than is usually recognised. This discussion points, it is argued, to the necessity 
to identify, measure and differentiate among welfare state changes (Part three). Once they 
have been identified and compared, the reforms can be analysed as a chain of various types of 
reforms, the previous one being a pre-condition for the following one; The comparison of 
welfare reforms in Continental Europe shows the existence of a common trajectory among 
bismarckien welfare systems, and highlights the importance of sequencing reforms in the 
understanding of how Bismarckian welafer systems have changed (Part four).  
  1A fifth part is still there, in italics, proposing some explanation for these trends, to 
check with you whether it should be kept (and other part reduced, or removed. 
 
I. How to characterise the Bismarckian world of welfare capitalism? 
 
Comparisons of welfare state reforms that have been carried out recently have almost 
all been framed by Esping-Andersen’s seminal typology of welfare capitalism. Esping-
Andersen sought to compare and classify the various types of social protection systems 
existing in industrialised countries, which may be distinguished both by their underlying 
value systems and their institutional configuration. This typology is based principally on the 
effects of social policies, which are taken to reflect the ideological options adopted, and as a 
result the names given to these systems reflect their underlying ideological concepts. 
Esping-Andersen thus distinguishes between three types of social protection systems: the 
social democratic, the conservative-corporatist and the liberal. 
There has been continuous debate about the Esping-Andersen typology (for reviews 
see e.g. Abrahamson, 2003; Arts and Gelissen, 2002). Despite a number of criticisms, it 
seems that recent research on welfare reforms inevitably comes back to this three-fold 
distinction. Indeed, most collective books either refer to the ‘three worlds’ in their choice of 
countries (see Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000 or Pierson, 2001), or organise the comparison 
explicitly through groups of countries that reproduce this division (see Esping-Andersen, 
1996 or Sykes, Palier and Prior, 2001). Moreover, findings usually suggest that there are 
‘three worlds of welfare reforms’, with comparative studies concluding that there are different 
processes of welfare state adaptation that can be associated with each world of welfare 
(Scharpf and Schmidt 2000; Pierson 2001b). The three paths for welfare state change result 
from the three different contexts of historical and institutional constraints in each welfare 
system. Scharpf and Schmidt (2000) convincingly show that the three worlds do not 
experience the same kinds of vulnerabilities in the face of the new global and European 
environment. Examining the implementation of several policies, Pierson proposes that -   
besides cost containment which is common to all welfare reforms - a specific type of reform 
is predominantly pursued in each world of welfare capitalism: ‘re-commodification’ in the 
liberal welfare states, ‘rationalising re-calibration’ in the Nordic countries and ‘up-dating re-
calibration’ of the Continental systems (Pierson, 2001b: 455). 
The findings of recent research have led to the conclusion that reforms had a limited 
impact on the structure of the different welfare states, not threatening but instead preserving 
and even reinforcing the very nature of each system. Thus, due to various processes of 
marketisation in social protection, and the re-commodification strategy adopted, liberal 
welfare states have become even more residual and liberal (Taylor-Gooby, 2001). Social 
democratic welfare states, thanks to an egalitarian distribution of cuts (around 10 per cent 
across all benefits) and a rediscovery of ‘the workline’, are similarly returning to their 
traditional road to welfare (Kuhnle 2000, Revue française des affaires sociales, 2003). And, 
from the point of view of much comparative research, most of the continental welfare states 
have remained essentially the same, not only because reforms have reinforced their 
characteristics, but also because of an apparent inability to implement any substantial reform 
at all (giving rise to terms such as ‘eurosclerosis or ‘frozen fordism’).  
However, the research that has been conducted to date has either included all types of 
welfare regimes
1, or focused on liberal
2 or Scandinavian regimes
3. No systematic 
                                                 
1 ESPING-ANDERSEN, Gøsta (ed.), 1996, Welfare States in Transition, National Adaptations in Global 
Economies, London, Sage; FERRERA, Maurizio, RHODES, Martin (eds.), 2000, Recasting European Welfare 
States, West European Politics (Special Issue), April; LEIBFRIED, Stephan (ed.), 2001, The Future of the 
Welfare State, Cambridge University press; PIERSON, Paul, (ed.), 2001, The New Politics of the Welfare State, 
  2comparative research has been conducted on the recent developments of Bismarckian, 
‘conservative corporatist’ welfare regimes. One can only find isolated national case studies, 
for example on the Netherlands (Hemerijck and Visser, 1997), Italy (Ferrera and Gualmini, 
2004), France (Palier, 2002) or Germany (Seeleib-Kaiser, 2004). 
The aim of this paper is to propose a framework for a systematic comparison of 
welfare reforms within the ‘conservative corporatist’ world of welfare capitalism, with the 
idea that more has occurred within these systems than is usually recognised. Here, we will 
focus on reforms to existing social policies and the introduction of new types of social 
policies in welfare systems and specific social programmes that share the common features 
usually associated with the Bismarckian tradition of social insurance, or the ‘conservative 
corporatist’ world of welfare capitalism.  
These features have already been characterised in the comparative welfare state 
literature. Esping-Andersen and others have identified three main approaches to the 
conception, implementation and management of social protection mechanisms
4. Instead of 
trying to read Esping-Andersen’s typology as a description of the ‘real worlds’ of welfare 
capitalism, it is useful to conceptualise it as isolating distinguishing ideal-types, 
differentiated both in terms of policy goals (logic or conception) and policy instruments 
(‘ways of doing’, institutions). These ideal types define a body of principles, values and 
political, economic and social objectives that can be associated with a prevailing institutional 
configuration that determines the rights and benefits, the financing and the management of 
the social protection of individuals resident in a nation. They also help to identify the role 
and position given to social protection institutions in relation to other factors of social 
protection (the market, the family and the voluntary sector), as well as the objectives 
pursued (and achieved) in terms of individual welfare and changes in social stratification. 
Such ideal-typical categories can help to situate the core features of any real welfare system, 
or even any welfare programme, notwithstanding the complexities which inevitably 
characterise any empirical reality. 
In terms of policy goals, one can identify three political logics in Esping-Andersen’s 
work: the liberal, the social-democratic, and the conservative-corporatist. The presentation of 
these logics can be supplemented by a review of the gender relationships dominating in 
these three models (Lewis, 1992, Orloff, 1993), and of the relationship between the 
voluntary sector and the State under these various configurations (Sarasa, 1995). 
                                                                                                                                                          
Oxford: Oxford University Press; SCHARPF, Fritz W., SCHMIDT, Vivien A., (eds.), 2000, From Vulnerability 
to competiveness: Welfare and Work in the Open Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2 volumes; 
SYKES, Rob S., PRIOR,  Pauline, PALIER, Bruno (eds.), 2001, Globalization and European Welfare states : 
challenges and changes, Londres : Macmillan; TAYLOR-GOOBY, Peter (ed.), 2001, Welfare States Under 
Pressure, Londres, Sage STEPHENS, john D., HUBER, Evelyne, 2002, Development and crisis of the welfare 
state : parties and policies in global markets, Chicago : University of Chicago Press; SWANK, D., 2002, Global 
Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press; WILENSKY, Harold, 2002, Rich Democracies: Political Economy, Public Policy, and 
Performance,  University of California Press. 
2 See for instance: PIERSON, Paul, 1994, Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher and The Politics of 
Retrenchment, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Ann Orloff, Julia O'Connor, Sheila Shaver, 1999   
States, Markets, Families:  Gender, Liberalism and Social Policy in Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and the 
United States, New York, Cambridge, and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. 
3 Kautto, M., J. Fritzell, B. Hvinden, J. Kvist & H. Uusitalo (eds.) 2001. Nordic Welfare States in the European 
Context. London: Routledge ; Revue française des affaires sociales, « modèle nordique », 2003. 
4 Esping-Andresen uses three criteria to differentiate the three worlds of welfare capitalism: the level of de-
commodification achieved by social protection systems; the relationship between the institutional configuration 
and the various forms of social stratification; and the relationship between the state, the market and the family. 
  3The so-called “conservative-corporatist” model, that we may want to re-name 
“categorial” or “Bismarckian” model, organised on the basis of occupational categories, is 
designed much less to reduce inequality than to provide workers with security, and to 
conserve status. The level of social protection offered to each beneficiary is determined by 
market performance and employment situation. As a result of the relatively generous level 
of the social benefits provided, it also guarantees insured individuals a certain level of 
independence in relation to the market in the event of a contingency. In this case, 
dependence on the market is indirect in so far as the level of social benefits provided by 
these systems is itself related to prior employment (and family situation). The universality 
of coverage is therefore dependent on the capacity of society to ensure full employment. 
This model is frequently associated with a family structure based on the male breadwinner, 
which implies that women are left with prime responsibility for caring (Lewis, 1992). 
Under this model, the participation of women in the labour market is fairly low (France 
being an exception). Voluntary associations are organised on an ideological or religious 
basis and maintain neo-corporatist relations with the state under the principle of subsidiarity. 
They organise social services supported by public financing. These associative groups 
exercise a major influence over the social policies adopted by the state. 
To achieve their objectives, the various systems make use of a range of techniques 
(means-tested assistance benefits, contributory benefits provided by social insurance on the 
basis of social contributions in bismarckien ones, social services or flat-rate benefits). In 
order to be able to identify and compare specific ways of providing welfare - which will 
henceforth be referred to as “welfare institutions” - one can distinguish four principal 
parameters by which public social protection systems can be differentiated (cf. Ferrera, 
1996, who was the first to spell these dimensions out, before they were taken up and 
developed further notably by Bonoli and Palier, 1998):  
_  (1) the rules and criteria governing eligibility and entitlement: who is entitled to the 
benefit? 
_  (2) the forms taken by the benefits: what types of benefits are provided? 
_  (3) financing systems: who pays and how? 
_  (4) the organisation and management of the scheme: who decides and who manages? 
 
We will here analyse and compare reforms that occurred in countries where welfare 
systems are mainly based on the “categorial” approach of welfare, and where the welfare 
institutions are mainly based on entitlements associated with employment status, contributory 
benefits, financing through social contribution and management of the systems by funds 
(“Kassen”, “caisses”, “caza”…) that are more or less independent from the state. Our basic 
hypothesis is that the similarity of welfare conception and institutions partly explains the 
similarities in the problem profile and in the trajectories of these welfare systems. This type of 
welfare system is found mostly in Continental Europe. Indeed, most countries of the 
European continent, having followed the Bismarckian route of welfare state development, can 
be considered as ‘social insurance states’ and share common features: access to benefits are 
linked to work position (instead of citizenship or need), most of the benefits are in cash and 
contributory (instead of flat-reate benefits or social services), much of their social outlays are 
financed via earnings-related contributions (instead of taxation) and they have established a 
more or less ‘corporatist’ management of their schemes (not directly run by the state - this is 
the term ‘welfare system’ is more appropriate than ‘welfare state’ when characterising them). 
The comparative welfare state literature has shown that Germany, Austria, France, 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Hungary or Czech Republic have developed 
welfare systems that are the closest to this ideal-type (Germany usually being the reference 
  4case). In suggesting that these countries share a logic is mostly or mainly Bismarckian, and 
institutions mostly or mainly based on social insurance, it should be emphasised and 
acknowledged that any real welfare system is never pure, and  thus represents a complex mix 
of policy goals and institutions. Of course, family policies in France are of universalist 
inspiration, the health care system in Italy is a national health care system of Beveridgean 
inspiration,  and Italian trade unions do not play there an important role in the management of 
the system etc. However, all these countries are closer to each other than to other welfare 
systems (such as the Swedish or the British ones). The French welfare system is certainly not 
identical to the Germany one, but it is considerably closer to the German than to the Swedish 
system, and thus reflect both similar principles of welfare and comparable ‘ways of doing’ 
welfare. Therefore, the French and German systems should also experience some similar 
difficulties and some similar reform dynamics. 
  We identify welfare institutions that Bismarckian welfare systems have to a greater or  
lesser extent in common as a central variable for identifying and understanding the politics of 
recent welfare reforms. 
 
II. The importance of welfare institutions 
 
In the literature, three different phases of the development of the welfare state are 
commonly identified. A first period of emergence of welfare states (nineteenth century to 
second world war) was succeeded by the “golden age of the welfare state, its period of steady 
growth (from 1945 to the mid 1970s), which was in turn superseded  by an era of difficulties. 
This last period is that in which the crisis of the welfare state has been analysed, and when the 
so-called new politics of the welfare state in a period of permanent austerity (Pierson, 1998, 
2001) emerged; others have referred to the ‘silver age’ of the welfare state (Tayor-Gooby). In 
fact, this last period is perhaps more accurately divided into two different ones, a ‘first third’ 
period being ‘the crisis of the welfare state’, before a ‘second third’ period of more intense 
and creative reform, of ‘restructuring’ and ‘recasting’ of the welfare state (Ferrera, Rhodes), 
and of the search for  a ‘new architecture’ for the welfare state (Esping-Andersen (ed.), 2002). 
This latter period can be dated from the mid 1980s or early 1990s onwards (with differential 
timing depending on the country/welfare system, see below). Here, we will more precisely 
focus on (and distinguish) these two moments of recent (‘stage three’) welfare state 
development, that is the crisis of the systems, and their period of reform and change. 
The current literature on welfare state change does not focus specifically on 
Bismarckian welfare regimes, but draws a comparative picture of their development, in 
contrast with other regimes. When he analysed ‘national adaptation in global economies’  and 
compared the various capacities of different welfare regimes to face the new economic 
challenges, Esping-Andersen emphasised the rigidity of the continental welfare state 
arrangements, speaking of a ‘frozen continental landscape’ resulting from the ‘frozen 
Fordism’ found in Germany, France or Italy (Esping-Andersen, 1996). He concluded that ‘the 
cards are very much stacked in favour of the welfare state status quo’ in these countries 
(ibid.:267). As mentioned previously, Scharpf and Schmidt (2000) have shown that if all 
welfare states do present vulnerabilities to the new open economic context, the welfare 
systems based on social insurance face the biggest difficulties of all welfare states, while 
Pierson (2001) argues that reforms have been rarest and most problematic in conservative 
corporatist regimes.  
As depicted by the current literature, most of the continental welfare states remain the 
same, not only because the reforms reinforced their characteristics but also because they seem 
unable to implement any important reforms. While other welfare regimes have been able to 
overcome their difficulties through the introduction of reforms inspired by their own tradition 
  5(see above), Bismarckian welfare systems not only appear unable to find a way out of the 
crisis in their own traditions, but actually seem to be locked into their difficulties by the very 
weight of that tradition. How do the literature explain this situation? 
Bismarckian welfare systems are said to be both the most challenged by the new 
economic context and the most frozen of welfare states. Interestingly, when trying to explain 
why Bismarckian welfare systems face such enormous challenges, authors usually refer to 
welfare institutional designs, but when trying to understand why reforms are so 
comprehensively blocked, they neglect these welfare institutions in their explanations, in 
favour of broader political factors. If the impact of welfare institutions on the specific 
economic and social problems met in Continental Europe seem indeed important, we will 
argue that one should also focus on the impact of welfare institutions in order to understand 
the politics of the reforms implemented. 
 
The most challenged welfare systems: Welfare institutions and new economic and 
social challenges 
 
The literature on welfare state crisis identified several causes of the welfare state’s 
difficulties since the mid-1970s, including socio-economic challenges such as mass and 
structural unemployment, population ageing, rising female labour market participation, 
increasing capital mobility and intensified competition between economies. Though these 
trends are important everywhere, the literature on welfare state change has shown that they do 
not impact in exactly the same way on all countries, since they are filtered by welfare 
institutions. In order to demonstrate why Continental welfare states are the most challenged, a 
number of analysts refer to the institutional settings of their welfare programs. Esping-
Andersen (1996) has argued that their difficulties are partly due to the necessity to defend the 
so-called ‘family wage’ (thereby excluding the youngest, the oldest and women from the 
labour market). By family wage one has to understand the status associated with employment: 
a salary plus all the social benefits associated with it. Here, Esping-Andersen underlines the 
problem of a system where the social benefits are mostly linked to work, are given to the male 
breadwinner, and are mainly in cash and contributory. It is thus the type of social benefits 
delivered in Continental  Europe which helps to explain the specificity of the problems these 
systems face. In a similar perspective to Scharpf and Schmidt (2000, see above), Daly (2001) 
has shown that the Bismarckian welfare states present three specific pressure points in the 
face of globalisation: the funding structure and methods for financing (which create problems 
of labour costs), the highly legitimate nature of the claim structure (which hamper 
retrenchment), and the lack of flexibility in a cash benefit-based system (which prevent new 
social risks to be covered).  
 
  A frozen landscape? 
 
Despite the profound difficulties they face, change has until recently been difficult to 
implement in Bismarckian social protection systems. The current literature on welfare state 
reforms is highly influenced by Paul Pierson’s work. He has convincingly shown that the 
politics of the welfare state under conditions of austerity are different from the politics of the 
‘golden age’ (Pierson, 1996). In his recent edited volume (2001) Pierson and his colleagues 
provide insightful institutionalist explanations of the politics of welfare reforms, which focus 
on the way institutions such as systems of interest intermediation and political structures 
shape the new politics of reform (Pierson, 2001, part Two and Three). When trying to explain 
why it is so difficult to reform one has partly to refer to the general political institutions of 
each country (Bonoli, 2001) as well as to the political orientation of the government (Levy, 
  61999 ; Ross, 2000). The variables that are usually mobilised for explaining the reforms or the 
absence of reforms are usually related to the political system rather than welfare institutions 
per se.  
 
These variables take very different values within the family of Bismarckian welfare 
regimes (for example, Germany has a federal political system while France has a highly 
centralised system). However, one can see similarities in the politics of the reforms. There is 
considerable evidence that this is a common pattern in all these countries, which has probably, 
therefore, to be explained by similar variables. Since all these countries do not share the same 
political system, it is hard to defend the idea that a reference to the political system (e.g. the 
number and strength of veto players…) can explain why they are – in every case - difficult to 
reform. To understand the politics of the reforms in these cases, it seems more promising to 
look at the kind of incentives that their similar welfare state institutions create.  
As Bonoli and Palier have shown (2000), welfare institutions structure debates, 
political preferences and policy choices. They affect the positions of the various actors and 
groups involved in reform processes. They frame the kind of interests and resources which 
actors can mobilise in favour of, or against, welfare reforms. In part, they also determine who 
can and who cannot participate in the political game leading to reforms (the identity and 
number of veto players). Depending on how these different variables are set, different patterns 
of support and opposition are likely to be encountered.  
 
Why are Bismarckian welfare systems so frozen? The influence of welfare institutions. 
 
One could thus argue that all the institutional characteristics of the Bismarckian 
welfare states contribute to its resistance to change: contributory benefits enjoy a particularly 
high level of legitimacy and are therefore difficult to be cut back radically. Transfers are 
‘paid’ by social contributions, so workers assume that they have ‘bought’ social rights. 
Benefits are usually generous, so their loss would be more significant than the reduction of a 
benefit which is already at a low level. People prefer to pay more (contributions) than seeing 
their benefits (bought by their own work) diminished. Finally, insurance-based transfers are 
well defended by organised interests, and in particular by trade unions of the different 
branches corresponding to the different professional schemes.  
  
In Continental Europe, governments have long preferred to increase social 
contributions than to cut social benefits. This is counter-intuitive from an Anglo-Saxon (and 
even a Scandinavian) point of view, where the most politically risky thing to do is to raise 
taxes, and where the population prefers some cuts in social programmes to any tax increases. 
These differences are due to the differences in the type of benefits and, moreover, in the way 
in which they are financed. In Bismarckian countries, most of the cash benefits are 
contributory, earnings-related benefits. And the bulk of social expenditure is financed through 
employment related contributions. There is a crucial difference between tax- and contribution-
financed schemes in their ability to attract public support. Whereas taxation goes to the state, 
social contributions are perceived as a ‘differed wage’ which will return to the insured person 
at times of sickness, unemployment or retirement. Paying health insurance contributions, for 
instance, ‘buys’ a right to health care which guarantees protection during periods of sickness. 
From a political point of view, contributions are raised much more easily than taxes, 
especially income taxes. 
On the benefit side, it is more feasible to reduce flat-rate or means tested benefits than 
earnings-related ones. Since earnings-related benefits are often expressed as a proportion a 
salary, there is a form of ‘automatic’ indexation on earnings, which tends to be the most 
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terms of replacement rates unless cuts in the benefit formula are adopted. These are highly 
visible and politically difficult to implement. Moreover, as they are contributory, people think 
that they have ‘bought’ their own social benefits through the social contribution they have 
paid. Therefore, they are not ready to accept a reduction in provision for which they have 
been working. On the contrary, they are ready to pay more as long as it guarantees a high 
level of benefit.  
Here again, the difference in the financing mechanisms is essential here. Whereas 
taxation goes to the State, social contributions are perceived as a ‘differed wage’ which will 
come back when the insured person is sick, unemployed or aged. Where a Reagan, a Thatcher 
or a Major could denounce the excessive weight of taxes and the unwarranted cost of the 
social benefits delivered to those who do nothing, it was much more difficult for continental 
European politicians to attack social insurance rights acquired by all the working population 
through the payment of social contributions. Instead of reducing highly legitimate benefits, it 
was much easier to raise social contributions, as long as it was to preserve the social rights of 
all workers and families, and the level of their benefits.  
 
Whereas for retrenchment in leiberal welfare regimes, the popiulation targeted was 
usually weak and not well represented, and whereas in Universal regimes, it wqas the whole 
population which was concerned by reforms, in Continental Europe, the beneficiaries of 
social protection susceptible to cuts where well represented and defended by labour unions 
while the State encountered high difficulties to impose retrnechment policies. In most 
Bismarckian welfare systems, management is shared with trade unions and employers, 
responsibility tends thus to be diluted, diminishing the capacity of the state to control the 
development of the social protection system, and particularly levels of expenditure. Union 
involvement in the management of social security grants unions a de facto veto power against 
welfare state reforms (Bonoli and Palier, 1996). 
 
  We see that each traits of Bismarckian welfare institution tend to contribute to render 
welfare retrenchment extremely difficult. However, simply saying that cuts to social 
insurance benefits are difficult to implement does not tell the whole story of welfare reforms 
in Continental Europe. More happened  - and is happening – in such systems than is usually 
suggested in the general comparative welfare state literature. The conventional assessment of 
the frozen landscape in Continental Europe is based on comparison with others, where 
important reforms  have occurred sooner, and where they could be analysed in terms of 
retrenchment, cuts and quantitative changes. A more subtle view of social policy change is 
needed in order to grasp all the full range of reforms that have been and are implemented in 
continental Europe. 
 
 
III. Frozen or insufficiently explored landscape? The necessity to differentiate among 
reforms.  
 
Is the realm of social insurance so frozen? 
 
  Bismarckian welfare systems have been seen as frozen because few cuts were 
implemented there during the 1980s and early 1990s, compared to the experience of other 
countries. However, changes other than retrenchment have been implemented in continental 
Europe. Reforms with important retrenchment effects in the long run were actually decided in 
the mid 1990s. Moreover, in the early 2000s, substantial reforms are being planned for social 
  8protection systems in Continental Europe : the Schröder 2010 Agenda and the various Hartz 
reforms include sweeping changes in labour market policies, in health insurance as well as in 
pension; the 2003 Raffarin/Fillon pension reform and the Douste Blazy 2004 health care 
insurance reform meant profound changes in France; the Berlusconi government intends to 
enact further pension reforms in Italy; and the Austrian government did negotiate a pension 
reform in 2002/2003. This new wave of reforms - which is unfolding in a context of economic 
recession and high unemployment which is particularly preoccupying in Continental Europe - 
tends to contradict the idea that continental Europe is a frozen landscape as far as welfare 
reform is concerned. One could even show that more reforms occurred sooner than is usually 
recognised. But in order to see such changes, it is first necessary to change the framework of 
analysis of welfare reforms, which to date has been overly focused on retrenchment. 
Retrenchment seems to have become one of the most common terms employed to 
describe recent welfare state developments. The notion lends itself to a staged or functionalist 
model of analysis of the history of welfare states: emergence (late 19
th century until 1945) is 
followed by growth (the golden age, mainly until the 1970s) to limits (or even crisis, in the 
1980s), and then followed by retrenchment (since the late 1980s). The notion of retrenchment 
carries the same problems as those of development, modernisation or growth of welfare 
states. All were criticised for assuming a uniformity of the processes of welfare state 
development. If all changes which have occurred since the 1980s can be termed retrenchment 
they would imply shrinking all welfare states. Therefore, in this framework, the main question 
is often to measure how much retrenchment has been applied, with large or small cuts as the 
dependent variable and a focus on spending. Yet, a great deal of academic discussion during 
the 1990s was aimed precisely at demonstrating that even if expenditure levels were similar, 
different welfare states spent money differently, under different principles, for different 
purposes and with different institutions (Esping-Andersen 1990). If the lessons of these 
debates are kept in mind when focusing on recent changes, it should be envisaged that 
different welfare states are currently changing differently. Even if an increasing number of 
efforts are being made in that sense (Esping-Andersen 1996; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000; 
Pierson 2001), there is still a need for a systematic differentiation of processes of 
retrenchment, different “reform trajectories”, as there was a differentiation between welfare 
states development trajectories during their ‘golden age’ (Esping-Andersen 1990).  
It could be argued that retrenchment is a reductive term because certain changes in 
some social protection systems might not bring about less generous benefits. As the trente 
glorieuses  could not be analysed merely in terms of ‘more’ welfare state, current 
developments are more complex than simply representing ‘less’. Firstly, data show that most 
of the OECD countries have increased their social spending over the last two decades. 
Already in the early 1990s, Pierson (1994) concluded that, if anything, overall welfare 
spending had increased over the years he studied. He concluded that government wanted to 
retrench, but this was made impossible by the political power of those (‘programmatic 
constituencies’) defending welfare state, and as a result the present consequences of past 
commitments. This may be true for liberal welfare states, but another perspective seems more 
appropriate as far as other welfare systems are concerned. In recognition of the new problems 
which welfare states were confronting, some governments were in fact willing to spend more 
rather than less. It seems, at least, that this was the case for many Bismarckian countries in the 
late 1970s and during the 1980s (Palier 2000; Manow and Seils 2000). 
Secondly, for governments the question may not be a quantitative one (of more or less 
spending), but instead a structural one: how can welfare states be transformed in order to 
promote new principles and to develop new institutions which are more adapted to the current 
(economic and social) situation? Accordingly, reforms are not necessarily aimed at benefit 
levels or access conditions and thus cannot be considered as retrenchment (neither as 
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reforms, since they can introduce changes in the very nature of national welfare state systems. 
In this case, the measurement of change should not be quantitative (in terms of expenditure, 
benefit levels, scope of coverage, etc.), but should instead provide an assessment of the degree 
of innovation introduced by changes. Typical questions would be whether reforms introduced 
new institutions, promoted a new logic or led to the involvement of new actors. Thus, what is 
needed for our purpose is a framework of analysis which helps to distinguish, identify and 
assess these kind of changes.  
 
Differentiating between social policy changes 
 
When emphasising the inertia of institutions (‘frozen landscapes’ and ‘path 
dependency’), current research often ignores the structural impact which public policies may 
sometimes have. While integrating phenomena of path dependency in welfare state analysis is 
essential, this should not prevent us for examining the impact of different reforms on social 
policy. In other words, recent developments within the social protection systems are not only 
due to their own evolutionary dynamic, but also about the implementation of public policies. 
Incorporating public policy aspects of change into the study of the ways in which social 
protection systems adapt suggests the advantages of making use of the tools of public policy 
analysis, and particularly of Peter Hall’s approach to policy change. An increasing number of 
scholars are adopting this framework of analysis to promote understanding of social policy 
reforms, especially in Bismarckian countries (see for instance Visser and Hemerijck, 1997, 
Palier, 1999, Hinrichs, 2000, Guillemard, 2003).  
Elaborating his framework for analysing macro-economic policy changes, Hall (1993) 
distinguished between three different types of changes
5. This approach helps to differentiate 
between the different impact which a reform will have, depending on whether or not it 
changes the instruments and/or the overall logic. It provides a grid for assessing the type of 
change beyond a purely quantitative approach (more or less retrenchment) and a means for 
judging the degree of innovation introduced by a specific reform. A first type of change will 
not imply profound changes as far as a historical path is concerned. It simply implies a change 
in the setting of instruments (such as raising the level of social contributions or lowering 
benefit levels without changing the mode of financing, the type of benefit or the mode of 
access to it). It does not imply a change in the general principles and logic.  
A second type of changes involve the introduction of new instruments (i.e. the 
introduction of new calculation rules or new entitlement rules in pension). These types of 
changes appear to be path dependent. Most of them appear to be using new instruments in 
order to preserve the existing system and its principles. Yet, they may lead to substantial 
changes once they have been put in place and developed over time
6. Studies of recent welfare 
                                                 
5 ‘We can identify three distinct kinds of changes in policy… First, [a change of] the levels (or settings) of the 
basic instruments. We can call the process whereby instrument settings are changed in the light of experience 
and new knowledge, while the overall goals and instruments of policy remain the same, a process of first order 
change in policy… When the instruments of policy as well as their settings are altered in response to past 
experience even though the overall goals of policy remain the same, [changes] might be said to reflect a process 
of second order change… Simultaneous changes in all three components of policy: the instrument settings, the 
instruments themselves, and the hierarchy of goals behind policy… occur rarely, but when they do occur as a 
result of reflection on past experience, we can describe them as instances of third order change’ (Hall 1993: 278-
279). 
6 Myles and Quadagno (1997) illustrate this. Within pension systems, a transition from a defined benefit to a 
defined contribution scheme implies a change in the mode of pension benefit from deferred wages to savings, for 
instance. 
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two fist types of changes 
However, further reforms may introduce new instruments associated with new goals, 
and thus possibly represent in the long run what Hall has termed ‘paradigmatic changes’ (Hall 
refers to the shift from Keynesian to monetarist policies; an equivalent in social policy might 
be the shift from unemployment compensation to activation policies). Adding to these three 
categories of changes, Hemerijck and Visser (1997) identify an intermediary type of change 
between instrumental and paradigmatic change, which they call ‘institutional change’. This is 
when a basic institution of a welfare system is reformed, such as through privatisation of a 
public service, or a change in the financing mechanism (taxes replacing social contributions, 
for instance). These institutional reforms are focused on institution themselves, without 
explicitly mentioning the goals, but usually they also imply a change in social policy goals. 
Therefore, they could be associated with third order changes, but incremental ones. 
Beyond quantitative criteria (more or less spending), it is then possible to distinguish 
different categories of changes, on the basis of qualitative, but objective, criteria. We can now 
apply this framework of analysis to the main developments of various welfare reforms, trying 
to identify the specific trajectory of in Bismarckian welfare systems. 
 
IV. A common trajectory? 
 
According to existing analyses of national studies (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997; Palier, 
1999, Ferrera, Gualmini, 2002; Hinrichs, XXX), it seems possible to hypothesise that 
Bismarckian welfare systems have been subject to various types of reforms in a rather 
successive way, thus demonstrating a specific reform trajectory. During the last 25 years, 
governments from continental Europe have implemented different types of reforms aimed at 
coping with welfare state problems. They of course tried to reduce the level of social benefits, 
that is to introduce retrenchment policies, especially during the early 1990s. But, before that, 
especially between the mid 1970’s and the late 1980’s, governments followed another policy 
path, increasing both expenditures and social contributions in order to face increasing social 
needs. This was ‘before retrenchment’. Since the early 1990’s, they have also introduced 
policies aimed at re-structuring the whole welfare system, policies which are going ‘beyond 
retrenchment and introduce institutional reforms.  Recently, all government have introduced a 
second wave of sectoral reforms, aimed at not only retrenching public social insurance 
benefits, but also at restructuring the systems themselves, multiplying the types and providers 
of benefits. 
 
  Before  Retrenchment 
 
During the late 1970s and the early 1980s, governments in Continental Europe 
responded to social difficulties mainly by raising the level of social contributions. In 
recognition of new problems which they were confronting, governments thus spent more, 
rather than less: In Germany, ‘The 80’s were not a time of simple retrenchment. Under 
conditions where neither federal nor state government was obliged to pay the welfare bill, the 
door was open for increased benefits or expanded entitlements’ (Manow and Seils 2000: 279). 
During the 1980’s, while they were decreasing the level of direct income taxation, the French 
governments were raising the level of social contribution paid by employees. Among taxation, 
the share of social contribution has increased dramatically (from 39% in 1970 to 46% in 1995) as 
well as their proportion of GDP: in 1978, the volume of social contribution equalled less than 
20% of French GDP, and almost 23% in 1985 (Palier, 2002). The state was not paying the 
welfare bill: it was financed by social contributions.  
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different ways. In part, governments paid the bill of commitments made in an earlier period 
(See Pierson, 2001 for such an explanation). But governments, especially in continental 
Europe, also increased the generosity of social benefits, notably for those who were 
particularly hard-hit by the economic crisis (redundant industrial workers, lone parents, poor 
elderly, long-term unemployed…). In particular, many governments developed benefits aimed 
at removing job seekers from the labour market – such as early retirement schemes and 
invalidity pensions -  implementing what Esping-Andersen called the ‘welfare without work’ 
strategy (Esping-Andersen, 1996). The point here is that this policy path appeared feasible 
since all the related increases in expenditure were offset by politically acceptable increase in 
social contributions, which occurred repeatedly in these countries during this period. It can be 
claimed here that during this period, first order changes were implemented in order to cope 
with the new situation (economic crisis, growing unemployment, deficits in social welfare 
budgets), with governments using the instruments already available: their policies consisted 
mainly in increasing the generosity of existing benefits, and in increasing the level of social 
contributions. 
 
Pressure for retrenchment: the 1990s 
 
From the early 1990s, a changed context prohibited the continuation of these kinds of 
policies. Under conditions of economic recession (in the early 1990’s), and with the economic 
constraints of the European Single market and single currency becoming stronger, Continental 
European governments decided (felt obliged) to opt for retrenchment in the social protection 
system.  
This is when first retrenchments appeared. Reforms were introduced which aimed at 
reducing the level of social benefits while preserving the logic of a given system. One can 
refer here to the so-called ‘consolidation’ reforms implemented in Germany at the end of the 
1980s and during the early 1990s, or to the French sectoral reforms, aimed at “rescuing the 
social security system” (new medical agreements in health care, a new benefit in 
unemployment insurance and new modes of calculating retirement pensions; cf. Palier, 
2000:122-126). One could also refer to the Italian pension reforms of 1991 and 1995, or to 
similar ones in Spain (included in the Toledo pacts in 1995), and so on. 
Such re-calibration reforms introduced new instruments but remained within the 
traditional (historical and institutional) logic of Bismarckian welfare system. These reforms 
seem to share certain features, which appear to be related to the specific institutional  settings 
of social insurance welfare systems. 
First, the retrenchment reforms were not presented as a means to dismantling the 
Bismarckian welfare state, but of preserving it, and consolidating it. In the political discourse 
justifying the reforms, one heard that if reform was necessary, it was not because the system 
was dysfunctional, but because it was suffering the ill-effects of the current situation, where 
resources were decreasing (because of economic slow down, unemployment…) and spending 
was increasing (because of unemployment, aging, new social demands…). Since it no longer 
appeared possible to further increase resources, governments had to retrench (a bit). This 
discourse can be understood if one remembers the high legitimacy of the benefits delivered by 
this kind of social insurance systems and the strong attachment of the population to them. 
These reforms were not made in the name of criticisms of welfare redistribution, but in the 
name of the crucial necessity to restore their viability. 
Second, such reforms were usually negotiated, often between different political 
parties, and almost always with social partners (for pension, See Schludi, 2004). This can be 
understood as a consequence of the participation of the social partners in the management of 
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on wages (and not through taxation), the representatives of those who pay to and benefits 
from the systems are central players in the political game concerning social policy reforms 
(Bonoli, Palier, 1996). They have a say in the process of the reforms, and have the power to 
eventually block them if they do not agree. Here, the role of these veto players should be less 
understood with reference to the general political institutions than with reference to the 
welfare state design. Indeed, France is far from being a consensual political system; however, 
as in other Bismarckian systems, no social policy reforms could be passed in France without 
(at least implicit) agreement of (at least a majority of) the social partners. 
Third, the main technique used to reduce welfare benefits in these reforms was to 
increase the ‘contributivity’ of the benefits, i.e. strengthening the link between the amount of 
contribution and the volume of the benefits (through a change in the calculation formula 
and/or stricter entitlement rules). This of course relied on the already existing logic of these 
social insurance schemes (where one gets the right to social benefits by paying social 
contribution), even though these reforms usually meant a shift from redistribution (horizontal 
and vertical) to actuarial principles. 
Finally, the acceptance by social partners of these decreases in benefits were usually 
based on a quid pro quo (Bonoli, 2001), based on the distinction between what should be 
financed through contribution and what should be financed through taxation. Retrenchments 
in social insurance programs are often accompanied by a clarification of responsibility, the 
government proposing to the social partners to assume the financing of non-contributory 
benefits (flat rate social minima for the elderly, the handicapped, the long-term unemployed; 
crediting of contributions for period out of work because of unemployment, child rearing…) 
in exchange of the decrease of social insurance benefits. 
  These changes have been based on new instruments (changes in calculation rules, shift 
from defined benefits to defined contribution systems, creation of new state subsidies…), but 
were perceived as preserving the very nature of social insurance, and sometimes even at 
reinforcing it (the social partners, for example, often think that making the state pay for non 
contributory benefits help to ‘purify’ and thus reinforce social insurance). They do not really 
challenge the principles of social insurance and can be considered as second order changes.  
 
  Beyond retrenchment: institutional reforms 
 
However, since the early 1990’s, the welfare systems that are based on social 
insurance have been increasingly perceived as exacerbating economic, social and political 
difficulties. Before retrenchment, social insurance benefits were used as a support for the 
victims of the crisis (compensation) and as a tool to counter it (reflation policies, welfare 
without work strategies). In the following period, when continuous increase in social spending 
appeared to be unaffordable, retrenchments were attempted, but essentially to save social 
insurance, which was perceived as to be the victim of the crisis (less resources, more 
expenses). In the analyses supporting further and deeper reforms, the systems have become 
part of the cause of the crisis. In France, for example, social insurance has been accused of 
partly causing a number of economic, social and political problems: the contributory nature of 
most social benefits was accused of reinforcing social exclusion; the weight of social 
contribution of hindering competitiveness and preventing job creation; the participation of 
social partners in the systems of weakening the state capacity to control expenditure and to 
implement reforms (Palier, 200, 2002). One can see here that in the recent analyses of the 
problems met by Bismarckian welfare systems, the causes of the difficulties seem to be the 
very characteristics of these systems themselves (contributory benefits, financed by social 
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retrenched, but also profoundly transformed. 
It is, then, not only social scientists who acknowledge the impact of institutions on 
problems, and their role in shaping, and sometimes preventing, change. Through learning 
processes, experts and politicians have also come to recognise these effects - and sometimes 
therefore to decide on changes to the institutions. In most of the social insurance welfare 
systems, (some) structural changes are taking place in order to face these structural 
difficulties.  
In order to cope with new social problems that social insurance is unable to deal with, 
governments have developed new social policy instruments, with reference to new social 
policy goals. Faced with the growing amount of jobless, youth or long-term unemployed and 
lone parents, new benefits have been created, or former marginal benefits have been 
developed: these are targeted flat-rate benefits, usually financed by taxation and run by the 
state. Governments have also started to develop more active labour market policies (Clegg, 
XXX). In order to cope with uncontrolled increase of health expenditure, the level of public 
coverage has been reduced, leaving more room for private insurance (Palier, 2003, Wendt, 
XXX). In order to cope with demographic ageing, pension reforms have introduced small 
private top ups, voluntary and pre-funded pensions over above PAYG mandatory pension 
(Bonoli, XXX). In all cases, the coverage by social insurance (both in terms of generosity and 
of universality) is diminishing, leaving room for other types of social policy instruments, but 
also goals. 
Besides change in benefits, some other basic pillars of social insurance are 
reformed/transformed: contribution financing and the involvement of the social partners in the 
management of social security. Some recent reforms have been aimed at modifying these 
institutional arrangements (financing and the management of social security). This is certainly 
the case in France with the increase of exemptions for social contributions, as well as the 
development of a new tax to finance non-contributory social benefits (CSG); and with the 
empowerment of Parliament in the social policy-making process (Palier 2000, 2001). One 
could also mention reforms introduced in other Bismarckian countries (for example, the 
introduction of a ‘green tax’ in Germany to replace some social contribution funding, or the 
introduction of private employment services in the Netherlands). These institutional reforms 
introduce new instruments that are usually linked to another logic of welfare (taxation, public 
or private management of the benefits). They are structural changes which may transform the 
very nature of the system.  
 
The second wave of reforms of the 2000s 
 
Since the early 2000s, a new wave of reforms is developing in Continental Europe: the 2003 
pension reforms and the 2004 Health reforms in France, the Hartz reforms and the 2010 
Agenda in Germany, etc. These reforms are not only retrenching social insurance benefits, 
they contribute to implement structural adaptations that institutional reforms allowed in the 
first place. In pension, not only are benefits planned to be reduced, but a new basic safety net 
is implemented in Germany, and fully funded schemes are proposed to German (Riester 
funds), French (PERP and PERCO), or Italien citizens. In Health, more and more room is 
given to competition and private actors, through either the Douste Blazy reform or through 
the 2003 German changes. Activation measures are gaining forces in all the unemployment 
reforms implemented in France, Gemrany or other continental European countries in the early 
2000s (Clegg, XXX). 
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protection plus new employment policies (activation, making work pay) may mean a general 
paradigmatic change for continental welfare states, evincing a shift from systems aimed at 
income and status maintenance towards activated and employment friendly welfare systems. 
All these structural adaptation may appear marginal in the first place. However, the study of 
the French case shows that if they may appear trivial when introduced, usually being 
presented as a mere complement to the still central social insurance systems, these policies 
can develop little by little, to eventually form a veritable ‘second world’ of welfare within one 
country (this is the case for the new targeted benefit -RMI or the nex tax - CSG in France, See 
Palier, 2000). It has become clear that France has now a dual welfare system (Palier, 2002). 
On the one hand there are ‘national solidarity schemes’: family benefits, health care and 
poverty alleviation, delivering either universal or targeted benefits, mainly financed by 
taxation and controlled by the state. On the other hand, the pensions and 
unemployment/employment policies  have been retained in the social insurance world, even 
though the meaning of social insurance is changed, becoming more reliant on actuarial and 
activation principles. Ferrera (1996) has shown that dualization also marked the development 
of Southern European welfare states. 
 
In terms of explanation, it seems that each type of change need a specific explanation. 
The first type should probably be understood in terms of path dependency, where government 
do what they are used to doing, and where institutions really do frame the problems and the 
type of reforms adopted. We have already presented the type of institutional mechanisms that 
may explain why Bismarckian welfare systems are difficult to change.  
As for the second type of reforms, exogenous forces seems to have played a role, since 
European constraints and economic crisis seem to have been relevant in explaining why 
governments in continental Europe decided to change their policies and opt for retrenchment, 
despite the political cost involved. Contrary to the neglect of the impact of EU on welfare 
state reforms current welfare state literature (Pierson, 1998, 2001), we hypothesize that 
European economic policies channel and bind welfare reforms, especially in Bismarckian 
countries. 
Indeed, in several continental welfare states, the timing of the reforms that have been 
implemented is intriguing. In continental Europe, a first wave of retrenchment reforms in old 
age insurance, health care insurance and unemployment insurance was concentrated in the 
first half of the 1990s, during the preparation of the single currency: the Amato (1992) and 
Dini (1995) pension reforms in Italy, the various pension reforms (during the 1990s), and 
1992  Seehoffer Reform of health care in Germany and the 1993 Balladur pension reforms 
and the 1995 Juppé plan (implemented as far as health insurance is concerned) in France. 
Moreover, in the early 1990’s, certain European countries (Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark, 
Spain, Itlay) concluded social pacts which included important reforms of part of their welfare 
states (Rhodes, 2001). It may be that the timing is purely coincidental, but all the above listed 
reforms were justified by governments as necessary sacrifices to meet the Maastricht criteria. 
Even though one could argue that these reforms would have been necessary without 
Maastricht (since the major problems are not linked with Europe, but with domestic 
developments
7), and that Maastricht was a simple scapegoat allowing governments to avoid 
blame, it appears that the Maastricht process helped governments, at least rhetorically, to 
impose reforms otherwise seen as infeasible, especially in the welfare systems of continental 
Europe. Even if it may be disregarded as being only symbolic, the use of the reference to 
                                                 
7 ‘The available evidence casts doubt on the claim that in the absence of growing economic integration welfare 
states would be under dramatically less pressure, and national policy-makers markedly more capable of 
addressing new public demands.’ (Pierson, 1998: 541) 
  15Maastricht in the political discourse justifying reforms should be considered as one of the 
reasons why there has been reforms, instead of nothing at all (Schmidt, 2002). In that sense, 
to paraphrase Radaelli (2000), EU political, social and economic dynamics became a part of 
domestic political discourse and public policies in the welfare state field, thus showing that 
the process of welfare state reforms were at least partially Europeanised
8.  
Moreover, the content of these measures were different form the previous ones. All the 
aforementioned reforms implied retrenchment in social benefits. The early 1990’s were the 
years when the single currency started to be prepared, and also years of recession. Faced 
with the recession, the traditional (Keynesian) use of social policies would have been to 
sustain or even re-boost demand through an increase in social benefits. Here, the reaction 
was the opposite, imposing cuts in social benefits in a period of economic recession. This 
reversal has to be linked with the new economic context created by the implementation of the 
single market and by the preparation of the single currency under Maastricht criteria. The 
macro-economic policies resulting from economic integration have been influential on the 
content of welfare state reforms. If Maastricht imposed the timing, it may also have limited 
the range of responses to welfare state difficulties, or even given a specific general 
orientation to welfare reforms. As F. Scharpf has demonstrated, changes in the international 
environment had strong implications for the policy instruments available to governments. 
European integration is part of these international changes. ‘The Maastricht criteria for 
joining the Monetary Union have practically eliminated deficit spending as a policy tool; and 
the realisation of the Monetary Union has completely removed monetary policy and exchange 
rate policy from the control of its member states’ (Scharpf, 2000).  
As a consequence, increasing social benefits and social contributions (which means 
increasing labour costs) as a solution to deficits created by temporary reflation policies was 
much less affordable than before, since it could not be compensated through an adjustment of 
the exchange rate in order to maintain the competitiveness of national products. The effect 
seems particularly important for continental welfare states. They are usually referred to as 
frozen welfare systems since they did not implement important retrenchment during the 
1980’s. We have seen that instead of nothing, they did something: they dealt with their 
problem (deficits of social insurance funds) by increasing social contributions. This solution, 
politically easier than retrenchment in a context where insured salaried people prefer to pay 
more in order to guarantee a stable level of social protection, appeared to be maladapted in 
the new economic context. It is only under the constraints imposed by the Maastricht criteria 
that, in Continental Europe, a change occurred in the policies implemented  : instead of 
increasing social contributions, they started to try to reduce the level of social benefits 
through the reforms mentioned above.  
 
We think therefore that European constraints partly explain the development of 
reforms in Bismarckian countries. The European constraint mainly reflects a growing divorce 
between economic and social policy. Welfare reforms in the late 1990s and in the 2000s can 
be understood as attempts to reconcile economic and social policies and find new social 
policies fitting with supply-side economic policies. It appears that this search often leads to 
new social policies and paradigmatic changes in welfare systems. 
 
In order to understand these kind of reforms and search for innovation and adaptation 
(mainly the two last type of changes in policy: institutional and structural reforms), one has 
not only to refer to institutional and exogenous constraints as explanation, but also to the role 
                                                 
8 C Radaelli argues ‘that the concept of Europeanization refers to a set of processes through which the EU 
political, social and economic dynamics become part of the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political 
structures and public policies.’ (2000: 4) 
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First type of changes can be understood as the first response which governments may adopt 
when faced with a difficulty which at this stage is not perceived as a new problem. By only 
changing the settings of the usual instruments, ‘old recipes’ are resorted to, repeating what 
governments are used to do. Hall points out that as a response the first oil shock in the early 
1970s, British governments applied ‘traditional’ Keynesian policies with the aim of boosting 
demand. Similarly, French governments after the mid 1970s merely did what they were used 
to doing, i.e. raising social contribution rates in order to finance the growth of social 
expenditure, rather than reducing social expenditure (Palier, 2000). 
However, in something which is progressively perceived as a new context, old recipes 
produce unintended effects or ‘anomalies’. Advised by different kinds of experts (among them, 
at times, social policy comparativists) governments have become convinced that they need to 
abandon the previous ways of doing things  - which are now perceived to be wrong - and 
innovate. Two different paths seem available here: the introduction of some innovation which 
is aimed at preserving the given logic of a system (for example, the so-called ‘consolidation’ 
reforms implemented in Germany at the end of the 1980s and during the early 1990s, or the 
French sectoral reforms, see Palier 2000:122-126) or a change of some of the rules of the 
game (institutional changes), as well as its goals (paradigmatic shift) in order to adapt the 
whole system to the new context. Thus, if one wants to understand the political process of 
changes, one has also to refer to the changes in understandings, perceptions and debates 
around welfare state during the last 25 years.  
 
Conclusion: Towards a new world of welfare capitalism? 
 
In order to cope with structural problems, Bismarckian countries have created new 
benefit programs which follow new logics (means-tested benefits, private funded schemes in 
pension and health systems), have developed new modes of financing, partly replacing social 
contributions, and have implemented new management arrangements (privatisation of some 
administrative tasks, empowerment of the state at the expense of the social partners).  
These changes are the result of a process of policy learning. They have been (or will 
be) implemented only very gradually. Probably because of their marginal scope and because 
of the fact that they do not directly affect the level of expenditure, few analyses have 
concentrated on these types of changes, compared with the more common analyses of welfare 
state change which tend (especially with regard to continental welfare systems) to emphasise 
path dependency and continuity.  
The key question for the future is whether the accumulation of these kind of 
innovations may mean a structural change in Bismarckian welfare systems, leading to one (or 
several) new architecture(s), i.e. new principles and new ways of doing, a departure from the 
traditional “conservative corporatist” way of thinking and doing welfare and a move towards 
a new world of welfare capitalism. Our reading of the recent comparative literature is that 
both the liberal and the social democratic worlds of welfare found ways out of the crisis in 
their own tradition, and did not really need to implement third order changes. In contrast, it 
would seem such structural change not only necessary in continental European systems, but 
that it is probably already under way in some countries.  
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Types of 
change 
Context  Diagnosis  Content of the 
policy 
Politics of the 
reforms 
Consequences 
 
Before 
retrenchemnt 
 
- Economic 
downturn 
(mid 1970’s 
onwards), 
- raise in 
unemployment, 
- social budget 
deficits 
Social benefits can 
help the victims of 
the crisis 
* Welfare 
without work 
* raise in social 
contribution 
* change in the 
generosity of 
the benefits 
* Applying good old 
recipes 
* It is easier to raise 
social contribution  
than taxes, and than 
cutting social 
benefits 
* No big changes of 
the welfare state, 
frozen landscape 
* Increasing 
inefficiencies of such 
policies (raise in 
unemployment, 
stagflation) 
First wave of 
Retrenchment 
The 1990s 
-Economic 
recession (early 
1990’s) 
- Single market
- Preparation of 
the single 
currency 
- demographic 
changes, 
- maturation of 
the welfare 
states 
The systems have 
to be rescued, 
consolidated 
* increase in 
the 
contributivity 
of social 
insurance 
benefits 
* tax financing 
of non-
contributory 
benefits 
* Negotiated on the 
bases of clarification 
between insurance 
and 
assistance/solidarity 
* From social to more 
individual insurance 
(« erosion of share 
fate », Jacob S Hacker)
Beyond 
retrenchment 
Institutional 
reforms 
 
- post-industrial 
economy 
- End of 
Keynesianism 
-Global and 
European 
orientation/ 
coordination of 
economic and 
social policies 
 
* Welfare Systems 
are partly the cause 
of the crisis : work-
based entitlement 
re-enforce social 
exclusion ; income 
maintenance is 
disincentive to 
work ; 
social contribution 
damage 
competitivity and 
create 
unempployment ; 
corporatist 
management rules 
hinder reform 
capacities 
* increasing 
importance of 
new benefits, 
(universal or 
targeted), tax-
financed, 
managed by the 
State 
* expansion of 
private 
provision 
* new mode of 
financing, new 
taxes, less 
social 
contribution 
* new mode of 
management 
(public or 
private) 
* Virus strategy, 
layering : 
New provision, new 
institution are 
implemented at a 
marginal point, 
- on a contradictory 
consensus base, - 
Then they develop as 
to become a second 
pillar of the system 
 
Weakening of social 
insurances mechanisms 
and actors 
 
The second 
wave of 
reforms 
Path-breaking 
Changes 
The 2000s 
European Single 
market 
European 
monetary Union
Welfare systems 
need a profound 
adaptation to the 
new economic 
context 
- Diffusion of the 
OECD, EES, OMC 
ideas 
Multiplication 
of pillars in 
pension, active 
ageing 
* Activation of 
unemployed 
* Competition 
in health 
* Divisive reforms  * We are all supply-
siders now 
* From income 
maintenance to 
activation, incentives, 
employment-friendly 
benefits 
* Re-commodification 
* dualisation of the 
systems (social and 
private insurance/ 
assistance) 
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